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Abstract
There is a lack of research about the political strategies used by firms in emerging countries, mainly because the literature 
often assumes that Western-oriented corporate political activity (CPA) has universal application. Drawing on resource-
dependency logics, we explore why and how firms orchestrate CPA in the institutionally challenging context of Nigeria. Our 
findings show that firms deploy four context-fitting but ethically suspect political strategies: affective, financial, pseudo-
attribution and kinship strategies. We leverage this understanding to contribute to CPA in emerging countries by arguing 
that corporate political strategies are shaped by the reciprocity and duality of dependency relationships between firms and 
politicians, and also by advancing that these strategies reflect institutional weaknesses and unique industry-level opportuni-
ties. Importantly, we shed light on the muttered dark side of CPA. We develop a CPA framework and discuss the research, 
practical and policy implications of our findings.
Keywords Corporate political activity (CPA) · Corporate social responsibility (CSR) · Resource dependency · Ethics · 
Nigeria
Introduction
Africa’s business and institutional environments are both 
uncertain and volatile, largely due to governments’ actions 
and inactions. While some firms adapt to these environ-
ments, others proactively engage in corporate political activ-
ity (CPA)1 to shape their competitive space (Mbalyohere 
et al. 2017; Wocke and Moodley 2015). Within the CPA 
literature, researchers mainly draw from Hillman and Hitt’s 
(1999) political strategy typology, namely constituency 
building, financial incentive and information (e.g. Barron 
2011; Shirodkar and Mohr 2015b; Wan and Hillman 2006). 
Constituency building focuses on building coalitions to 
affect policy issues, financial strategy entails donating funds 
to politicians or political parties and information strategy, as 
the name suggests, utilizes information to lobby politicians. 
These strategies, to a large extent, are formal ways of influ-
encing government policy in strong institutional contexts. 
In Africa, weak institutions make some of these strategies 
inapplicable (Liedong and Frynas 2018). Even if they are 
applicable, their deployment is often fraught with unethi-
cal practices (Lawton et al. 2013a). For instance managerial 
political ties,2 the most prevalent mode of business–govern-
ment relations in emerging countries (Rajwani and Liedong 
2015), are largely associated with poor corporate govern-
ance, corruption, bribery, cronyism and other social ills 
(Johnson and Mitton 2003; Liedong and Rajwani 2018; 
Okhmatovskiy 2010; Sun et al. 2016).
Subsequently, while there is an extensive coverage of 
managerial political ties in emerging countries, research has 
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sparsely explored the full breadth of other political strate-
gies used by firms in these countries, especially those in 
Africa. The reason underlying this phenomenon is rooted 
in the widely held belief that because most emerging coun-
tries have relationship-based institutional structures owing 
to their collectivist cultures (Acquaah 2007; Fraser et al. 
2006; Sun et al. 2011), informal and personal ties to political 
actors are the main ways of influencing government policy 
(Liedong and Frynas 2018; Peng and Luo 2000; White et al. 
2015). Hence, there has been little effort to explore beyond 
political ties, which consequently limits our understanding 
of both the strategic and ethical implications of firms’ politi-
cal strategies in emerging countries. In this respect, there is a 
high chance that other institutionally driven political tactics 
have yet to be uncovered.
Recently, arguments have been advanced to show that 
emerging market institutions have strengthened to the extent 
that firms are able to use a wider array of western-oriented 
political strategies such as constituency building and infor-
mation (Shirodkar and Mohr 2015a). Indeed, while this may 
be the case for India, China and other advanced emerging 
countries, it may not be the same for frontier countries that 
are still battling with basic institutional voids. In most Afri-
can countries, there is hardly an interface for deploying an 
information strategy (Liedong et al. 2017), neither are the 
electoral laws effectively enforced to make political cam-
paign financing transparent (Liedong 2017). These lapses 
limit the scope of political strategization.
Nevertheless, firms in emerging markets, amid severe 
institutional constraints, may devise innovative and context-
fitting strategies to wield political influence. Research has 
conceptually mooted that CPA is influenced by national 
government systems and managers’ cultural socialization 
(Barron 2011; Hillman and Keim 1995). Broadly, what this 
suggests is that CPA is context-dependent, mainly as firms 
will design, organize and implement their political strategies 
in ways shaped by the conditions prevailing in their external 
environments. However, despite this postulation, there is still 
a lack of research that explore CPA in developing and weak 
institutional contexts, especially in Africa where various 
management phenomena remain under-explored (George 
et al. 2016).
The above gaps in the literature evoke the question: why 
and how do firms conduct their CPA in weak institutional 
contexts? We answer this question using interview data 
from bank executives, which we corroborate with second-
ary data (i.e. media articles, news blips) about politicians’ 
connections and dealings with banks. The secondary data 
allowed us to overcome constrained access to politicians, 
while accounting for both sides of the dyadic bank–politi-
cian relationship.
Our study draws upon resource-dependency theory (Pfef-
fer and Salancik 1978). According to this theory, firms are 
dependent on the contingencies in their external environ-
ments, and their behaviour does not only reflect this depend-
ency, but it also attempts to reduce the uncertainty associated 
with dependency (Hillman et al. 2009). Extant research rec-
ognizes that governments and politicians, due their regula-
tory power, are sources of dependency for firms (Schuler 
1996; Lester et al. 2008; Hillman 2005; Hillman et al. 2000; 
Keim and Zeithaml 1986; Meznar and Nigh 1995). This is 
particularly true in developing countries where politicians 
have a stronger control over access to critical resources and 
valuable information (Guo et al. 2014; Peng and Luo 2000; 
Acquaah 2007). However, resource-dependency theory, as 
used in CPA studies, mainly portrays a one-way relation-
ship between firms and politicians in which the former are 
dependent on the latter. In other words, the usage of the the-
ory recognizes firms’ dependency on external parties, but not 
external parties’ dependency on firms. This fails to show the 
dynamic relations between firms and politicians whereby the 
latter can be dependent on the former for resources such as 
information and money to respectively formulate policy and 
finance election campaigns (Hillman and Hitt 1999; Bonardi 
et al. 2005; Lawton et al. 2014). In weak institutional con-
texts such as Africa where political campaign financing is 
opaque (Liedong 2017), vote buying is prevalent (Vicente 
and Wantchekon 2009; Vicente 2014), and electoral success 
depends on candidates’ financial endowment (Collier and 
Vicente 2012), it is highly likely that CPA will be shaped by 
an overlooked, under-explored and ethically suspect two-way 
dependency relationship between firms and politicians.
This study makes significant contributions to the CPA 
literature in developing countries. First, it reveals that politi-
cal strategization is highly context-dependent. In this sense, 
western-oriented CPA is starkly different from CPA in weak 
institutional environments. Building on De Villa et al. (2018) 
and advancing the dark side of CPA, we find that Nigerian 
banks align their CPA with their politico-socio-cultural con-
text, which leads to the deployment of unique strategies that 
have previously been undocumented. More importantly, we 
found that banks orchestrate four distinct but ethically sus-
pect strategies—Affective, Financial, Pseudo-Attribution, 
and Kinship strategies. Using primary and secondary data 
to capture the bank and politician fronts respectively, we 
show that institutional weaknesses offer unique opportuni-
ties for firms and industries to deploy political strategies 
that exploit their reciprocal or dual dependency relationships 
with politicians. In doing so, we help to address the problem 
of resource-dependency theory being applied in ways that 
have “largely focused on the dependence of one actor on 
the other without considering the reciprocal dependency” 
(Casciaro and Piskorski 2005, p. 169). This problem is very 
common in the way CPA is conceptualized and operational-
ized. Our study thus highlights the dyadic nature of resource 
dependency and demonstrates how the “interdependence” 
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(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) or “mutual dependence” (Casci-
aro and Piskorski 2005) dimension of resource-dependency 
theory manifest in CPA.
Second, this study suggests that political strategies may 
be industry-specific. The banking industry has a unique 
opportunity to manage the finances of politicians in return 
for policy favours. In this respect, banks in corrupt and 
institutionally voided countries can use financing tactics 
that are not available to firms in other industries. The use 
of these financing tactics is underpinned by a reciprocal 
or a two-way resource-dependency relationship whereby 
banks depend on politicians for regulatory and operational 
favours (as revealed in our primary data) while politicians 
depend on bankers for ethically suspect financial favours 
(as shown in our secondary data). The former reflects the 
common one-way portrayal of firms as actors that always 
depend on politicians (e.g. Guo et al. 2014; Hillman 2005; 
Hillman et al. 2000; Shirodkar and Mohr 2015a), but the 
latter demonstrates that firms in industries that are able to 
offer direct benefits or provide economic rent to politicians 
have exclusive opportunities to exploit reciprocal depend-
ency in their CPA.
It is worth noting that a small body of research has exam-
ined industry-specific CPA. For instance, Schuler (1996) 
found that between 1976 and 1989 when the U.S steel 
industry faced strong import pressures, firms used petitions 
and congressional testimonies to seek protection from the 
government. Lawton et al. (2013b) also documented how 
state-owned and non-state-owned airlines in the EU, in 
the wake of deregulation, leveraged human, network and 
structural resources to organize their political capabilities. 
Other studies have examined CPA in the electric utilities 
(Bonardi et al. 2006) and automobile (Hersch and McDou-
gall 2000) industries. We extend this nascent conversation 
by not only showing CPA in the banking industry, but also 
suggesting that some political strategies could be unique or 
exclusive to certain industries. While our results speak to 
mainly the banking industry, it is clear in this instance that 
the opportunity to provide “preferential” financial services to 
politicians, which is solely available to the financial services 
industry, provides a conduit for political influence in weak 
institutional contexts.
Third, this study provides empirical evidence of the 
complementarity between CPA and social responsibility 
(Liedong et al. 2015; Hond et al. 2014) and the likelihood 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) influencing political 
access (Hillman et al. 2004; Mellahi et al. 2016; Wang and 
Qian 2011). It shows that CSR is actually a type of politi-
cal strategy in Nigeria, just as it is in China (Jia and Zhang 
2016; Li et al. 2015; Su and He 2010). We find further evi-
dence showing that when CSR is used as a political strat-
egy versus when it is done voluntarily, social programs are 
carefully developed and effectively executed. Importantly, 
we depart from prior research to demonstrate that CSR may 
serve as a political strategy only when it boosts politicians’ 
re-election chances. We therefore add new knowledge to the 
bourgeoning CPA-CSR complementarity debate.
Finally, this study makes a methodological contribution 
by challenging the current conceptualization of political con-
nections. Most studies define politically connected firms as 
those whose senior managers have relationships with politi-
cians (Peng and Luo 2000; White et al. 2015) or those that 
have politicians on their corporate boards (Hillman 2005; 
Hadani and Schuler 2013). As this study reports, there are 
instances when the connections between firms and politi-
cians are embedded in ordinary employees, not directors, 
senior managers or large shareholders. Our findings show 
that in the affection strategy, female employees (mostly 
account officers, not top managers) are the banks’ connec-
tion to the polity. Similarly, in the kinship strategy, ordinary 
employees from politicians’ families, communities or con-
stituencies provide the leverage or link for banks to build 
political capital. While this is the case in Nigeria, we believe 
it will be similar in other relationship-based emerging coun-
tries. On the ethical front, this phenomenon shrouds political 
embeddedness and makes it harder to unearth shady political 
dealings. Overall, this study sheds light on the dark side of 
CPA, and hopes to inspire managerial and policy actions that 
will strengthen Africa’s institutions to curb corruption and 
other unethical practices.
The rest of the study proceeds as follows. In the next 
section, we review CPA literature and discuss the resource-
dependency theory. We then present the study’s methodol-
ogy and discuss the findings. We conclude by outlining the 
study’s theoretical and practical implications and suggesting 
avenues for future research.
CPA in Emerging Countries: Concept, Drivers 
and Strategies
CPA refers to “corporate attempts to shape government pol-
icy in ways favourable to the firm” (Hillman et al. 2004, p. 
838). It is “any deliberate firm action intended to influence 
government policy or process” (Getz 1997, pp. 32–33). Due 
to the impact government decisions have on business (Stigler 
1971; Weidenbaum 1980), it is widely believed that firms 
may struggle to gain sustainable competitive advantage if 
they do not pay attention to political processes and dynamics 
within their operating environments (Baron 1995; Hillman 
et al. 1999; Schuler 1996).
In emerging countries, one of the foremost drivers of 
CPA is resource dependency, mainly as political connec-
tions serve as substitutes for weak and absent market sup-
porting institutions (Peng and Heath 1996; Xin and Pearce 
1996). In these countries, voids in the product, labour and 
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capital markets (Khanna and Palepu 2010) suggest that firms 
experience severe constraints such as information asymme-
try and high transaction costs (Khanna and Rivkin 2001; 
Meyer 2001; Tong et al. 2008). Additionally, the regula-
tory environments in these countries are likely to be more 
restrictive (Ang and Michailova 2008). Further, the gov-
ernments in these countries play a more prominent role in 
resource allocation (Acquaah 2007; Park and Luo 2001; 
Peng and Luo 2000). In the midst of these conditions, firms 
in emerging countries depend on political actors for com-
petitive resources (Guo et al. 2014) and preferential treat-
ment in capital and policy markets (Dieleman and Sachs 
2008; Fisman 2001; Johnson and Mitton 2003; Khwaja and 
Mian 2005). Essentially, political connections are crucial 
for obtaining critical resources and facilitating economic 
exchange (Acquaah 2012), thus the need to establish and 
nurture them.
Resource-dependency theory posits that even though 
firms cannot use CPA to reduce their dependency on politi-
cians (Getz 1997), they can use CPA to reduce the uncer-
tainties associated with dependency (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978; Hillman et al. 2009). Indeed, studies using this theory 
tend to argue that firms do CPA to address their exposure 
to environmental uncertainty (Mellahi et al. 2016; Hillman 
et al. 2000; Wei 2006). Emerging countries have risky envi-
ronments (Puck et al. 2013; Liedong et al. 2017; White et al. 
2015), which makes business failures highly likely (Hei-
denreich et al. 2015; Nell et al. 2015). Firms, in the quest 
to mitigate their risk exposure, develop political connec-
tions (Liedong and Frynas 2018). These connections help 
them to obtain superior information and reduce information 
asymmetry in government policy discourses. They also offer 
them protection from bankruptcy and failure through bailout 
programs (Faccio et al. 2006) and lenient regulatory enforce-
ments (Wu et al. 2016). Importantly, political connections 
enable firms to overcome administrative obstacles such as 
bureaucracy and red tape—constraints that are replete in 
emerging markets (Liedong and Frynas 2018).
Building on the drivers of CPA, several scholars have 
found that CPA leads to improved firm performance (see 
Hillman et al. 2004; Lux et al. 2011; Mellahi et al. 2016; 
Rajwani and Liedong 2015). In this respect, it can be argued 
that competitive advantage is the ultimate latent motivation 
for CPA. This motivation lies at the centre of every busi-
ness organization, and has led some firms to establish divi-
sions and offices specially dedicated to government affairs 
(Brown 2016; Lawton et al. 2014). Some scholars have also 
advocated for upper echelons restructuring so that firms 
can better handle policy and social issues (Doh et al. 2014). 
These scholars contend that the ability to develop political 
capabilities underscores strategic agility, dynamism and ulti-
mately competitive advantage (Kotabe et al. 2017; Lawton 
et al. 2013b).
Indeed, CPA may improve firms’ bottomlines. However, 
CPA is also associated with poor governance and unethical 
practices. In emerging countries, CPA is often fraught with 
bribery, corruption and cronyism (Domadenik et al. 2016; 
Lawton et al. 2013a; Johnson and Mitton 2003). The absence 
of strong institutions to regulate business–government rela-
tions in these countries gives rise to clandestine and illegal 
dealings between public officials and firms. Politically active 
and connected firms also tend to be associated with poor 
financial disclosure practices (Chaney et al. 2011; Liedong 
and Rajwani 2018), financial misrepresentation (Guedhami 
et al. 2014) and excessive risk-taking (Boubakri et al. 2013; 
Bliss and Gul 2012). Moreover, CPA may serve as a means 
for managers to use corporate resources to pursue their per-
sonal political interests to the detriment of shareholder value 
(Okhmatovskiy 2010; Gao et al. 2017), thus creating agency 
problems (Carretta et al. 2012; Sun et al. 2016). Overall, 
CPA is not wholly positive. It only benefits a small and 
privileged minority of firms that are able to deploy political 
influence to unduly exploit public resources and enhance 
their competitive advantage (e.g. Capron and Chatain 2008; 
McWilliams et al. 2002).
Strategies and Antecedents of CPA
To gain competitive advantage, firms “may use political 
means to alter the condition of the external economic envi-
ronment” (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, p. 190). There are 
various ways of achieving this environmental alteration. In 
their seminal work, Hillman and Hitt (1999) proposed three 
political strategies, namely constituency building, financial 
incentive and information. Constituency building helps to 
build strong coalitions and public support for policy influ-
ence (Baysinger et al. 1985; Lord 2003) while financial 
incentive provides monetary inducements to political deci-
sion makers to sway them towards the interests of donating 
firms. Examples of financial tactics include political action 
committee (PAC) contributions and political directorships 
(Milyo et al. 2000; Stratmann 1991). Information strategy, 
as the name suggests, entails using information to shape 
policy decisions. Specific information tactics include lobby-
ing, research reports, and press conferences. Several studies 
have empirically examined these strategies (e.g. Hadani and 
Schuler 2013; Hillman and Wan 2005; Hillman et al. 1999; 
Marsh 1998; Schuler et al. 2002; McKay and Webb-Yackee 
2007), but of course these studies were mostly conducted in 
developed settings where frameworks and regulations exist 
to control CPA.
In emerging countries however, some of Hillman and 
Hitt’s strategies are largely inapplicable due to the lack of 
supporting institutional structures (Liedong and Frynas 
2018). In fact, the most prevalent political strategy in these 
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countries is the relational strategy (Rajwani and Liedong 
2015). It involves personal-level connections between man-
agers and politicians (see Acquaah 2007; Li et al. 2008; 
Peng and Luo 2000; White et al. 2015). Lacking any formal 
structure, this strategy is less transparent and highly sus-
ceptible to corruption, bribery, cronyism, favouritism, and 
clientelism. As it currently stands, we have sufficient knowl-
edge about personal-level political connections as well as 
their ethical implications, but we still do not know whether 
emerging market firms use other political strategies.
More importantly, the theorization and instrumentation 
of CPA strategies is mainly based on the statement that 
“firms are dependent upon the government, therefore they 
will engage in CPA” (Hillman et al. 2009, p. 1412). Indeed, 
studies using resource-dependency theory tend to suggest a 
one-way dependency relationship between politicians and 
firms (e.g. Guo et al. 2014; Lester et al. 2008; Hillman 2005; 
Wei 2006) whereby, according to Baysinger (1984), the lat-
ter manages government actors to achieve domain defence 
(i.e. rebuff threats to organizational goals) and domain main-
tenance (i.e. rebuff threats to the methods through which 
goals are achieved). Generally, resource-dependency theory 
assumes that power and dependency are opposite ends (Getz 
1997). In this sense, politicians never depend on firms. How-
ever, in reality, government actors depend on firms and other 
interest groups for information to formulate policy (King-
sley et al. 2012; Bonardi et al. 2005). Similarly, politicians 
depend on firms for campaign finance and donations (Hill-
man and Hitt 1999; Getz 1997).
Therefore, it is not always true that the relationship 
between firms and politicians is unbalanced. Instead, politi-
cal strategies could reflect and highlight interdependence 
between firms and the polity, more so in developing coun-
tries characterized by collectivist cultures (Barron 2011), 
relationship-based economic and social systems (Acquaah 
2007; Peng and Luo 2000), and weak or non-existent CPA 
regulations (Liedong et al. 2017). In Africa, political cam-
paign financing is opaque (Liedong 2017), vote buying is 
prevalent (Vicente and Wantchekon 2009; Vicente 2014), 
and electoral success depends on candidates’ financial 
endowment (Collier and Vicente 2012). These conditions 
create opportunities for firms to provide the resources that 
politicians need, and by doing so they can exploit interde-
pendency to orchestrate and deploy unique political strate-
gies. However, due to the static nature and application of 
the resource-dependency theory over the last four decades 
(Hillman et al. 2009; Sun et al. 2016), such new perspectives 
have not been explored.
Decades ago when the CPA literature began to grow, 
there was an interest to explore the antecedents of political 
intensity and political strategy choice. Several studies have 
since documented firm-level (e.g. Hillman 2003; Hansen and 
Mitchell 2000; Shirodkar and Mohr 2015a), industry-level 
(e.g. Gray and Lowery 1997; Grier et al. 1994; Schuler 
1996), and nation-level (e.g. Barron 2011; Blumentritt 2003; 
Hillman and Keim 1995; White et al. 2015) CPA determi-
nants. Noteworthy of these determinants is industry regula-
tion. Research suggests that highly regulated industries tend 
to be more politically active (Grier et al. 1994; Hadani and 
Schuler 2013) but beyond this knowledge, we know little 
about the political strategy choices of highly regulated firms. 
Bringing this into context, the highly regulated banking 
industry lacks representation in the CPA literature, which 
consequently leaves crucial questions unanswered. Consid-
ering the strategic role of financial institutions in credit-con-
strained emerging markets and the importance of money in 
African politics (Collier and Vicente 2012), do banks have a 
unique arsenal of political strategies at their disposal? Does 
the dependency of institutional actors (including politicians) 
on financial institutions for funds and financial services cre-
ate opportunities for banks to deploy previously undocu-
mented political strategies? The foregoing leads us to ask the 
following research question: Why and how do firms conduct 
their CPA in weak institutional contexts? We answer this 
pressing research question within the emerging context of 
Nigeria, and comment on the actual and potential ethical 
implications of firms’ CPA.
Research Context, Design and Methodology
Research Context
Nigeria is the world’s sixth major oil producing nation. It is 
Africa’s biggest oil exporter and largest economy with an 
average GDP growth rate of 5.7 percent between 2006 and 
2016 (The World Bank 2018). It is home to some of Africa’s 
largest multinational enterprises, including banks. Despite 
its strong fundamentals, Nigeria’s economy has been hob-
bled by high unemployment, weak infrastructure, security 
risks, inadequate electricity supply, and untrustworthy dis-
pute resolution mechanisms among other issues. Notably, 
the high rate of corruption prevalent in the country may have 
inflamed these institutional problems (PwC 2016). Nigeria 
records widespread corruption at all levels of government. 
Besides federal-level graft and political interferences in the 
work of anti-corruption organizations (Akume and Okoli 
2016), there is significant corruption at the State level. For 
instance, James Ibori, former Governor of Nigeria’s Delta 
State received a 13-year jail sentence in the UK for fraud and 
money laundering totalling about US$77 million. Accord-
ing to Ihonvbere and Shaw (1998, p. 151), corruption “per-
meated all aspects of Nigerian society and public affairs”, 
to an extent that Former President Olusegun Obasanjo 
remarked “there was corruption! Corruption! And Corrup-
tion! Everywhere and all the time!” (cited in Agbiboa 2012, 
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p. 330). Despite various efforts, corruption is still persistent 
in Nigeria (Transparency International 2017),3 especially 
in the public and civil services due to a myriad of reasons 
including institutional weaknesses and culture (Adegbite and 
Nakajima 2011).
As the level of corruption in Nigeria is very high (Trans-
parency International 2017), it is common for organizations 
to seek competitive advantage against their rivals through 
exchanges in the political market. Politicians in Nigeria 
wield significant power, which gives them an overwhelm-
ing control over resource allocation. Their influence perme-
ates the public and private sectors, helping them to provide 
rent and give operational and policy favours to their associ-
ates and cronies. Consequently, when firms are faced with 
uncertainty or threats, they tend to fall on their political con-
nections to navigate through institutional quagmires. In this 
sense, business success in Nigeria, to a large extent, depends 
on how firms utilize their political capabilities and connec-
tions. However, little is known about CPA in this context.
Further, strong materialism in Nigeria has led to greed 
and corruption, not only among the citizens but also among 
corporations (Agbiboa 2012; Nwabuzor 2005). In the pro-
cess of wealth accumulation, there is little or no regard 
for legality, morality and ethics. Making money trumps 
how money is made, because “the end always justifies the 
means.” In summary, Nigeria’s complex institutional envi-
ronment (Amaeshi et al. 2016) suggests that firms may 
deploy unique and previously undocumented context-fitting 
political strategies to facilitate their operations and enhance 
their commercial prospects. What could these strategies be?
We focus on banks due to well-informed reasons. 
Research shows that firms in highly regulated industries 
engage more with politicians (Grier et al. 1994; Mitchell 
et al. 1997; Hansen and Mitchell 2000). Banking is one 
of such industries (Hadani and Schuler 2013). Indeed, the 
banking industry is one of the most highly regulated in 
contemporary times. Following recent corporate govern-
ance failures and the 2007/2008 financial crisis, countries 
in Africa and beyond have tightened financial rules and 
increased bank monitoring.
For instance, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) intro-
duced the Public Sector Cash Reserve Requirement (PS-
CRR hereafter) in July 2013 to control bank behaviour. 
By this policy, all banks were subjected to a 50% reserve 
requirement on all government agency deposits, in addition 
to a traditional 12% reserve requirement on all other depos-
its. PS-CRR affected banks’ bottom-lines, as most of them 
relied on public sector deposits to create loans and maintain 
liquidity. In January 2014, the PS-CRR became more strin-
gent as it was increased to 75% (Central Bank of Nigeria 
2018). This further reduced the amount of public deposits 
available to banks for lending purposes, leading to a drop in 
interest revenues.
Hence, due to high regulation and strict monitoring, there 
is a general expectation for banks and other financial institu-
tions to be very active on the political front. Yet, there is a 
general paucity of knowledge and understanding about how 
these firms do their political activity. This is because politi-
cal strategy researchers have largely overlooked the banking 
and financial services industry. Within the nonmarket strat-
egy4 realm, studies have explored CSR in Africa’s banking 
sector (e.g. Amaeshi et al. 2006, 2016), but there is little 
to nothing on CPA. The industry’s strategic importance to 
economic development does not only make it a top priority 
for regulators (Zingales 2009; Meslier-Crouzille et al. 2012), 
but it should also be of keen interest to nonmarket strategy 
researchers.
Design and Data Sources
Studying corporate behaviour is complex. Hence, we used 
a qualitative research design to allow us to focus on micro-
level firm analyses and deepen understanding of CPA strate-
gies in weak institutional and complex political contexts. As 
Morse and Richards (2002, p. 28) point out, the use of quali-
tative research is appropriate if ‘the purpose is to learn from 
the participants in a setting or process the way they experi-
ence it, the meaning they put on it, and how they interpret 
what they experience’. We used in-depth semi-structured 
interviews to collect primary data, which we triangulated 
using archival and secondary sources to enhance validity 
and reliability (Eisenhardt 1989). As we explore a dyadic 
relationship but could only access one-party (i.e. banks) 
and not the other (i.e. politicians), we used secondary data 
(i.e. media articles, news blips) about the relationships, con-
nections and dealings between banks and politicians to cor-
roborate the accounts of the interviewed bank executives. 
We searched Nexis database using search strings such as 
“(corporate social responsibility OR CSR OR political con-
nections OR politicians) AND (banks OR financial institu-
tions) AND (Nigeria)”. We also searched Google to supple-
ment the Nexis data. These secondary data were analysed 
purely for their content, with a focus on finding evidence or 
inferences pertaining to politicians’ dependency on banks 
for favours and benefits.
In 2015, there were 21 commercial banks, five merchant 
banks and one non-interest bank in Nigeria. Of this total, 
4 Nonmarket strategy refers to tactics used to influence or address 
issues in firms’ political and social environments (see Baron 1995). 
It comprises two components, namely corporate social responsibility 
and corporate political activity (see Mellahi et al. 2016; Liedong et al. 
2015).3 See www.trans paren cy.org for countries overall rankings.
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24 were local. We sampled all the local banks to ensure a 
good representation of the banking industry and to gain 
diverse insights. Email invitations were sent to the banks 
to introduce the study and to request participation. Due to 
the sensitive nature of CPA, only two banks responded. 
We therefore relied on the first interviewees’ referrals to 
executives in other banks, which helped us to reach 13 
banks in total. Using referrals, our sampling process was 
emergent.
We selected interviewees based on their seniority (man-
agement level), involvement in managing external depend-
ence and significant years of experience in the organization 
(at least, 5 years). These criteria enabled us to collect infor-
mation from executives who were not only involved in their 
banks’ CPA, but were also knowledgeable of it through their 
longevity at the banks. In the majority of Nigerian banks, 
senior and general managers are usually members of their 
banks’ management committees, and are therefore involved 
in making strategic decisions for managing external rela-
tions and stakeholders. Longevity is particularly important 
because in relationship-based systems (e.g. Nigeria, China), 
trustworthy relations between managers and politicians can 
take long to develop (Peng and Luo 2000). Therefore, long 
serving managers may stand a better chance of nurturing 
connections between their firms and the polity, and may also 
be better placed to comment on their firms’ CPA. Given the 
volatile nature of political issues addressed in this study, 
participants and their banks were assured of anonymity and 
confidentiality to reduce social desirability bias and ensure 
effective communication (Miller et al. 1997; Yin and Zhang 
2012). In keeping with non-disclosure agreements, we do 
not offer descriptions of the banks in this study, because we 
believe that even basic information could make them iden-
tifiable, especially considering that the entire population of 
banks in Nigeria is small.
Data collection spanned 14 months (June 2015–August 
2016). We conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews 
with 15 bank executives from different levels and functional 
areas. To confirm the data, we tried to interview more than 
one executive in each of the banks and succeeded to do this 
for two of the 13 cases. The two cases demonstrated consist-
ency, suggesting that the information from single interviews 
is internally valid. Moreover, previous qualitative studies 
in the African context successfully used single respondents 
(e.g. Amaeshi et al. 2016; Luiz and Stewart 2014). Our 
descriptive statistics show that the informants worked for 
their respective banks for 8 years on average, suggesting that 
they were knowledgeable about the banks’ political activi-
ties. In line with other studies (e.g. Amaeshi et al. 2016), we 
sent the interview guide (which was piloted and revised) to 
the respondents to facilitate their preparation. Each inter-
view lasted between 45 min and 1 h, generating over 3000 
words of texts. We sent respondent copies of their interview 
transcripts to check content validity. See Tables 1 and 2 for 
a summary of data sources and sample characteristics.
Data Analysis
Overall, as there is a paucity of research on political activity 
in Africa (Rajwani and Liedong 2015), we used a grounded 
theory approach to allow theory to emerge from the data 
rather than fit data to any preconceptions (Strauss and Cor-
bin 1998). Previous CPA studies have also used grounded 
theory approaches to investigate under-explored issues (e.g. 
Shaffer and Hillman 2000). As we sought to identify and 
match patterns within and across the cases, our analysis 
drew upon previously validated approaches for qualitative 
theory development (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003). In keep-
ing with grounded theory principles, the analysis was done 
in three stages, starting from when the first bit of data was 
collected (Corbin and Strauss 1990). First, we analysed 
each interview transcript (i.e. within-case) to allow for an 
in-depth understanding of the study phenomenon (Gioia 
et al. 2013). This helped us to construct a story about CPA 
motives, organization and strategies for each of the cases. 
Subsequently, we did open coding to identify concepts and 
categories. During this stage, we developed first-order codes 
from the raw data. Starting from the first case, we developed 
a coding scheme around emergent patterns. As we analysed 
subsequent cases, we reflected on prior patterns and looked 
out for new ones. We merged similar patterns into the same 
first-order codes until we reached saturation (i.e. no further 
patterns emerged). After gaining insights from across the 
cases and inductively developing the first-order codes, we 
resorted to developing higher themes through axial and 
selective coding. During axial coding, we started an abduc-
tive process whereby we iterated between theory and data 
(Gioia et al. 2013; Langley 1999). This process helped us 
to identify linkages among the first-order codes, which led 
to the development of theoretically oriented second-order 
codes. In the final selective coding stage, we distilled and 
Table 1  Description of data
Data source Description Number
Interviews General Managers, Deputy General Manag-
ers
15
Assistant General Managers, Senior Manag-
ers
Financial Controller
Documents Annual Reports 78
Internal Reports and Memos 37
Archives Media articles about CSR in Nigeria 46
Media articles about politics and corpora-
tions
12
Total 188
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integrated the second-order codes into higher aggregated 
dimensions, which enabled us to understand CPA among 
Nigerian banks. Figure 1 provides an overview of our data 
structure.
Findings
This section captures results about “why” and “how” banks 
do their CPA in the emerging context of Nigeria. Precisely, it 
explores the drivers and motivations of CPA, and the politi-
cal strategies used.
CPA Drivers in Weak Institutional Contexts
Our data revealed that the main drivers of CPA are: (1) com-
mercial and business opportunity; (2) regulatory leniency 
and arbitrary treatment; (3) sense of security and protec-
tion; and (4) voice and influence. These drivers, to a large 
extent, are similar to previously espoused motivations for 
corporate political embeddedness in emerging countries. It is 
worth noting that they are also hinged on the strong depend-
ency of private enterprises on governments (Hillman 2005), 
especially in developing and emerging countries where gov-
ernment overreach is pervasive (Khwaja and Mian 2005; 
Liedong et al. 2017).
Commercial and business opportunities emerged as the 
overriding rationale and driver for developing political 
connections. The banks developed connections in order 
to win government’s underwriting business or contracts for 
collecting bills and fees on behalf of government agencies 
and public institutions. Respondents believe that politi-
cians can influence which financial institutions win bids 
to collect revenues. Indeed, in Nigeria’s corrupt context 
(Agbiboa 2012), political power permeates the entire pub-
lic sector.
We cannot do without the politicians. They are very 
powerful people. We have to do their bidding to 
remain in business. If we do not meet with them in a 
very personal way, they will not give us business or 
they can use the government machinery to frustrate 
us. These politicians ensure that their relations and 
friends are appointed to head various arms of the 
public sector, so they have control [Respondent A1].
We found that winning public sector deposits is the most 
salient commercial driver of CPA. These deposits come 
from government agencies and they are huge, often run-
ning into several billions of Naira. Banks rely on them 
for loan creation and profitability. It emerged that prior 
to 2013, much of the loan portfolio of some banks in the 
country was funded by public sector deposits. Banks still 
compete to attract public sector accounts and in this com-
petition, political connections are crucial. This commercial 
driver of CPA is unique and has not been captured in the 
literature until now, perhaps because previous studies have 
not explored CPA in the banking industry where deposits 
are crucial. As respondent H1 noted:
Deposit mobilisation is crucial for our profitability, 
growth and sustainability, and because the public 
sector deposits is very cheap source of deposits, it 
is very attractive for us. 95% of these deposits are in 
non-interest earning current accounts. We use depos-
its from the public sector to fund around 70-80% of 
bank’s risk assets.
Table 2  Sample characteristics Bank (case) Interviewee Interviewee position Years worked at Bank
A A1 General Manager, Business Management 10
A2 Senior Manager, Treasury 7
B B1 Assistant General Manager, Financial Control 9
B2 Senior Manager, Business Management 8
C C1 Chief Finance Officer 10
D DI Deputy General Manager, Business Support 10
E E1 Senior Manager, Business Support 7
F F1 Assistant General Manager, Business Management 10
G GI Senior Manager, Business Management 7
H HI Deputy General Manager, Business Support 9
I I1 Senior Manager, Treasury 7
J J1 Assistant General Manager, Business Management 9
K KI Senior Manager, Business Management 7
L L1 Assistant General Manager, Business Support 9
M M1 Senior Manager, Financial Control 7
Average: 8.4
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As previously argued, the banking sector is exposed 
to stringent regulation and tight deadlines. The room to 
manoeuvre is often non-existent, and if it exists, it is usually 
small and not all banks have equal laxity. Our data shows 
that the quest for regulatory leniency encourages CPA in the 
banking industry. Requests for deadline extensions to meet 
governance, operational or capital requirements are treated 
favourably if banks have political clout. In other words, 
political connections help with arbitrary application of the 
rules (García-Canal and Guillén 2008). In cases of breach, 
penalties are also less severe for politically connected banks. 
Even though the Central Bank of Nigeria has the mandate 
and responsibility for bank supervision, it is not immune 
from political influence. After all, politicians appoint the 
Governor of the Bank. Hence as a parastatal, it is susceptible 
to political capture. According to respondent B2:
Using female account/relationship officers
Employing politicians’ girlfriends/mistresses
Giving preferential loans and credit lines to politicians & allies
Overriding due diligence for politicians’ financial transactions
Helping politicians earn interest on public sector deposits
Doing CSR in politicians’ communities and constituencies
Employing family and relations of politicians
Employing from politicians’ communities and constituencies
Winning government contracts to collect bills and fees
Winning government underwriting business
Attracting public sector deposits
Getting deadline extensions 
Avoiding punitive actions
Gaining government protection from litigations
Gaining government support for loan recovery actions
Having a say in policy making
Gaining recognition as a powerful player in the industry
Gaining visibility in regulatory circles
Working together with other banks
Using banking industry committees
Working alone
Engaging with elected officials 
Engaging with the Central Bank 
Engaging with Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation
Developing social capital with politicians and bureaucrats
Nurturing long-term connections
Creating public/government relations roles and units
Affection
Financial
Politicians
Pseudo-Attribution 
Relational
Kinship
Dealing with pressing matters
Needing quick resolution and results
Commercial
Budget for public and government affairs
Financial wealth 
Leniency
Past performances of strategies
Security & Protection
Urgency
Voice & Influence
Resources
Individual
Outcomes
Collective
Bureaucrats
Political Strategies
Rationale for CPA
Levels of CPA
Targets of CPA
Approach to CPA
Determinants of 
Strategy Choice
First-Order Categories Second-Order Themes Aggregated Dimensions 
..
...
.
..
...
.
.
..
...
..
.
..
.
...
..
..
.
Fig. 1  Data structure
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The president appoints the governor of Central Bank 
of Nigeria (CBN), who in most cases is loyal to the 
President and related politicians. Therefore, through 
politicians, we enjoy some favours
Related to leniency, the quest for security and protection 
equally drive CPA. Operating in a context riddled with weak 
institutions, poor corporate governance and an ineffective 
regulatory regime (Amaeshi et al. 2016), Nigerian banks 
cultivate political connections for protection. Such protec-
tion includes shields against drastic penalties and support 
for credit recovery legal actions. Litigations to recover debt 
from defaulting parties are successful when there is political 
backing, a phenomenon that attests to the overreach of politi-
cal influence in weak institutional environments.
Further, we found that having a voice in policy discourses 
stimulates the development of political connections. Some 
bank officials acknowledge the major impact that even small 
regulations have on their operations and profitability, and 
therefore want to have a say in how the rules are made. With 
political connections, they stand better chances of being 
involved in policy consultations, which not only helps them 
to advocate for their preferred positions but also helps them 
to make advance preparations. This, of course, suggests that 
policy consultation in weak institutional contexts is reserved 
for privileged “club” members whose voice may override 
outgroups and the less privileged.
Far-reaching regulatory changes are an enormous 
challenge to us and we most quickly evolve our strate-
gies. Being connected to politicians gets us into pol-
icy consultations that will help us say what we want. 
[Respondent C1]
In summary, the foregoing shows that Nigerian banks are 
motivated to do CPA for a myriad of reasons. In developed 
markets, profitability and competitive advantage mainly 
drive CPA (Hillman et al. 1999; Baron 1995). However, 
in weak institutional environments, firms also do CPA to 
navigate uncertainty, voids, and other constraints. Table 3 
provides summarizes the drivers of CPA in Nigeria’s bank-
ing industry.
Organization of CPA
We found that the formulation and execution of CPA varies 
depending on the nature of the regulations or issues con-
fronting banks (Table 4). There are two categories of regu-
lations banks in Nigeria deal with—procedural and trans-
formational regulations. Each category is associated with 
a different type, target and level of political strategizing. 
Table 3  Drivers of corporate political activity
Motive Description Basis Factors
Instrumental Done because of benefits that will be gained Politicians have power to affect eco-
nomic outcomes
Commercial opportunity 
(contracts, resources)
Risk management (exposure 
reduction)
Information
Voice Done to have a say in what happens within the 
business landscape
Being able to say and change what 
affects business is important
Influence
Recognition in political circles
Relational Done to be connected to higher power Political backing guarantees safety Security
Protection
Table 4  Regulations and 
corporate political activity Procedural regulations Transformational regulations
Regulatory features
 Scope Revision/extension of existing rules New rules completely differ-
ent from existing ones
 Frequency Regular/periodic Occasional
 Change type Evolutionary Revolutionary
 Competitive impact Minimal Game-changing
Political strategy
 Level Collective Individual
 Approach Transactional Relational
 Attitude Passive Active
 Primary target Bureaucrats Politicians
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On the one hand, procedural regulations are concerned with 
governance of the banks. They are common and include day-
to-day operational issues and periodic filing of documen-
tation with regulators. Banks are passive about procedural 
regulations. Their stakes in these regulations are generally 
lower. Any strategies (mostly persuasive in nature) to influ-
ence procedural regulations are done collectively with other 
banks and are targeted at bureaucrats such as senior officers 
of the Central Bank (CBN). Banks only resort to political 
influence when Central Bank officials are not yielding.
For the day-to-day central bank supervision, we really 
do not bother ourselves on that. If we have to, we do 
it collectively as an industry through the bakers com-
mittee. [Respondent K1]
On the other hand, transformational regulations are game-
changing. They affect financial performance, raise the stakes, 
and elicit active political engagement. An example of such 
regulations was the 2013 PS-CRR, which restricted how 
much public deposits were available to banks for lending 
and liquidity. Banks respond to transformational regulations 
individually, with the hope of receiving exclusive exceptions 
that will give them superior competitive advantage in the 
industry. They target politicians at both the federal and State 
levels, using a top-down filtration approach. Influential and 
top politicians are prioritized first. All political activity aims 
to build relationships with political actors.
While the day-to-day CBN guidelines do not bother 
us, there are reforms and regulations that places enor-
mous challenge to banks, for example, PS-CRR and 
the treasury single account (TSA) whereby banks were 
mandated to remit all government ministries’ funds to 
the central bank. We were challenged on every side. 
We had to talk to top politicians to rescind the decision 
or give us exceptional treatment [Respondent I1]
Political Strategies
We found four political strategies from the data. We label 
them as Affective, Financial, Pseudo-Attribution, and Kin-
ship strategies. Some are dark, in the sense that they may not 
ethical. Others reveal the unique political influence oppor-
tunities available to only financial institutions. Below, we 
explore each of these strategies.
The Affective strategy involves identifying and recruit-
ing bank officials who are willing or capable of being emo-
tionally involved with politicians. It is a subtle approach of 
gaining political influence by arousing the sexual instincts 
of politicians. The affective strategy is unconventional and 
perhaps difficult to believe, but recent events lend credence 
to its existence and usage. In March 2018, it was revealed 
that Cambridge Analytica, a British political consulting firm, 
used dirty tricks to influence election outcomes in many dif-
ferent countries. The firm’s executives were recorded boast-
ing about using girls and sex to entrap political opponents 
(Agerholm 2018; Graham-Harrison et al. 2018). Whereas 
Cambridge Analytica’s tactic was to create sexual scandals 
to destroy or halt opponents’ political careers, Nigerian 
banks use the tactic to appeal to politicians’ soft side so that 
they can receive preferential treatment through emotionally 
involved female workers who are mostly employed as rela-
tionship or marketing officers. Most politicians in Africa, 
and perhaps around the world, are male. Due to the preva-
lence of polygamy in most African cultures (Fenske 2015; 
Schoellman and Tertilt 2006), male promiscuity is common 
and this makes the strategy viable. The affection strategy 
is highly unethical, mainly as it spurs bias in recruitment 
practices, exploits female employees and exposes them to 
sexual harassment.
You know that with the high rate of unemployment, 
girls are more willing to go the extra mile to be 
employed, retain their work and make extra money. In 
this industry, most of us (banks) seize the opportunity 
to make these girls relationship and account managers 
to these politicians in order to entice them for favours. 
[Respondent G1]
The Financial strategy is different from Hillman and 
Hitt’s (1999) campaign financing or political donations. 
With this strategy, banks offer preferential financial ser-
vices and treatment to politicians. They relax due diligence 
in financial transactions involving politicians, which may 
have implications for money laundering. Banks also help 
politicians to unduly earn interest on public sector deposits. 
As Nigeria is a highly corrupt country (Agbiboa 2012), it 
is common for her politicians to loot public coffers for per-
sonal gain. Suggestively, banks help politicians carry out 
such corrupt practices in return for political access and influ-
ence. Further, banks grant loans to the cronies and associ-
ates of the politicians in order to gain access to the polity. 
CPA studies in other emerging countries have documented 
high financial leverage among politically connected firms 
(Claessens et al. 2008; Khwaja and Mian 2005; Saeed et al. 
2015), which lends credence to this strategy of banks using 
connected firms to reach politicians (Houston et al. 2014). 
The extract below illustrates this claim:
Do you know that some politicians earn interest on 
public funds deposited? I can authoritatively tell you 
that we pay between 5-10% on these deposits. These 
are paid in cash to their cronies, companies and fam-
ily accounts to avoid audit trail. I know other banks 
that grant uncollateralized loans to politicians, their 
families or friends. Do you see the high volume of 
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non-performing loans in some bank books? [Respond-
ent M1]
Financial strategy reveals reciprocity or a two-depend-
ency relationship between politicians and banks, in the sense 
that the two actors are mutually dependent on each other: the 
banks help the politicians to gain financial resources; the 
politicians help the banks to win government business and 
overcome regulatory challenges. This “I scratch your back, 
you scratch my back” relationship gives financial institutions 
greater prominence in the eyes of politicians. Consequently, 
the financial strategy is the most effective for the banks.
As politicians cannot do without banks, banks also 
cannot do without politicians. Indeed, I can say that 
we complement each other. See, I say that this is a 
win–win situation. They win our secrecy and help 
while we win their support to achieve the bottom line, 
and promote our corporate interest. No one will want 
to stick his or her neck out for a politician if there are 
no concrete benefits for taking such risk. [Respond-
ent E1]
Secondary data corroborate these primary accounts. 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), in a report on money 
laundering, noted how domestic banking systems are used 
by politicians to embezzle public funds in Nigeria. In other 
words, banks’ support and cooperation is required for politi-
cians to launder money, and this support is based on mutual 
benefit.
In the case involving former governor of Plateau state 
in Nigeria, Joshua Dariye, for example, a grant for 
environmental contracts was made from the federal 
government to the State, and the money was deposited 
into a bank account established by the State. Dariye 
used his influence to cause the bank to issue a bank 
draft creditable to an account at a different Nigerian 
bank that Dariye had established under an alias about 
ten months previously (FATF, 2011:17)
In the Pseudo-Attribution strategy, banks use CSR for 
political ends. However, the way they execute CSR as a 
political strategy differs from the way they execute it for 
altruism purposes. When used as a political strategy, CSR 
is targeted at the constituencies and communities of focal 
politicians. The politicians are also involved in diverse ways, 
including commissioning and sod cutting, to make it possi-
ble for them to claim ownership or part-ownership of social 
programs. That way, they are seen to be contributing to their 
communities, and this bolsters their re-election chances. In 
Nigeria, elections are fiercely contested; hence, any help 
towards re-election is considerably reciprocated. Occasion-
ally, banks target their CSR at individuals or groups that 
are very close to politicians. In this way, they are able to 
appeal to the politicians. For instance, Stanbic Bank’s 2011 
sustainability program included “Office of the First Lady’s 
Retreat”, a project that:
Sponsored the international retreat on etiquette, proto-
col and administration for wives of all state governors 
in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Requested by the 
CEO as a means of capacity building within individual 
states of the Federal Republic of Nigeria5
Earlier suggestions that CSR could be used as a politi-
cal strategy were mulled over a decade ago (Hillman et al. 
2004). Since then, various studies have shown that, indeed, 
CSR is a political strategy in emerging countries, particu-
larly in China where it helps firms to gain access to the pol-
ity (Jia and Zhang 2016; Li et al. 2015; Su and He 2010; 
Wang and Qian 2011). Within the Nigerian context, the data 
further shows that when banks use CSR as a political strat-
egy, they work harder to ensure that the social programs 
are successful. It thus appears that when there is a political 
imperative for social interventions, CSR is highly needs-
based, effectively tailored, more philanthropic, and large 
scale. Essentially, politically motivated CSR is more intense 
than altruistic CSR due to high stakes emanating from the 
involvement of political stakeholders in the former.
Not all our CSR is politically motivated, but we also 
use CSR as a strategy to get the attention of politicians. 
Their communities are targeted for development pro-
jects. We ensure that the activities are successful, with 
praise and encomium given to the bank and politician. 
These things enable us gain access to them. [Respond-
ent A1]
Closely linked to the Attribution strategy, the Kinship 
strategy entails recruiting family members of politicians in 
order to establish a link with government. While this strat-
egy may seem similar to previous tactics which conceptual-
ize political connections to include friends and family of 
politicians (e.g. Fisman 2001; Sun et al. 2011), it differs in 
the sense that it also involves recruiting people from target 
politicians’ constituencies. In emerging countries such as 
Nigeria, unemployment is high (Ogbeide et al. 2016) and 
its reduction is a constant promise politicians make on their 
campaign trails. Additionally, most Nigerian youth have very 
poor perceptions of blue-collar jobs (Dike 2010); hence, they 
prefer white-collar positions such as bank work, which is 
highly regarded and prestigious. Banks exploit these situ-
ations, recruit from politicians’ communities and actively 
allow the politicians to take the credit for helping the youth 
5 https ://stanb icibt cbank .com/Niger ia/About Us/Corpo rate-and-socia 
l-respo nsibi lity.
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to gain employment. Again, as re-election chances are 
boosted, so is the chance of reciprocity.
Aside various community development program we 
embark upon, we also intentionally give employ-
ment to people from target communities, most espe-
cially relations and family members of politicians. 
[Respondent J1]
In Table 5, we provide a summary of the political strate-
gies and their enabling capabilities, supporting resources, 
and potential risks/ethical issues. Whereas the affective and 
financial strategies are out rightly unethical (e.g. biassed 
recruitment in favour of physical looks rather than merit and 
financial crimes), the case of pseudo-attribution and kinship 
strategies are not clear-cut.
Collectively, all four strategies fit the politico-socio-
cultural conditions and weak business–government inter-
face in Nigeria. We acknowledge the similarity of some of 
these strategies to other strategies used in emerging market 
contexts. However, we also observe some stark differences. 
First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first scholarly 
study to uncover how emotions and affections are exploited 
in CPA. Anecdotes suggest that sex is a tactic for political 
influence. For instance and as we mentioned earlier, senior 
executives at Cambridge Analytica bragged about how they 
can gain political leverage by using sex workers to entrap 
politicians (Agerholm 2018). Our study provides scientific 
and empirical evidence to corroborate such anecdotes. More 
importantly, while sexual anecdotes usually entail the black-
mail of politicians, the affection strategy we report in this 
study does not use extortion or intimidation. Instead, it aims 
to convince politicians, in a non-threatening way, to protect 
banks’ interests.
The exploitation of women to pursue business goals is 
not exclusive to Nigerian banks. The practice seems to be 
present in other corporations in the country. For instance, 
Dutch brewing giant Heineken was found to use “promotion 
girls” to boost beer sales in Nigeria (van Beemen 2019). 
Executives justified and framed this practice, which exposed 
the girls to sexual abuse, as a local custom. While such cases 
in Nigeria are consistent with globally documented use of 
sexuality in advertising and sales promotion (e.g. Gould 
1994), our affection strategy is unique in the sense that it is 
about exploiting girls to gain political influence, not to boost 
sales. Whether this specific use of girls for political access is 
a widespread practice in Nigeria is not yet clear. Neverthe-
less, we contend that the affective strategy is facilitated by 
weak institutional protection of women, which allows the 
abuse to persist.
Second, numerous studies have examined how firms 
influence government policy through financial donations 
and contributions to political parties and candidates (e.g. 
Claessens et al. 2008; Dean et al. 1998; Hadani and Schuler 
2013). However, the financial strategy in this study is dif-
ferent, in the sense that it is not just about firms donating 
money to politicians. Instead, it captures how banks wield 
political influence by providing preferential financial ser-
vices (beyond loans) to politicians.
Third, extant studies have shown that socially responsible 
firms benefit positive reputations, which give them greater 
access to the polity (Hond et al. 2014; Liedong et al. 2015). 
Hence, it is often argued that CSR can be used as a political 
strategy (Hillman et al. 2004; Li et al. 2015). Indeed, the 
pseudo-attribution strategy corroborates the use of CSR in 
CPA, but it goes beyond previously claimed reputational 
effects to show that political influence in weak institutional 
contexts may not come from simply doing CSR or merely 
being socially responsible. Rather, this influence comes from 
well-orchestrated social programs involving politicians and 
targeted at politicians’ communities. Essentially, until poli-
ticians are able to directly use CSR for political (election) 
purposes, CSR may not be an effective political strategy.
Finally, previous CPA studies measured political con-
nections by examining the relationship between firms on 
one hand and politicians or their immediate family mem-
bers on the other hand (e.g. Chaney et al. 2011; Faccio et al. 
2006). Hence, a firm could be politically connected when 
it employs the relation of a politician. The kinship strat-
egy reported herein looks beyond employing only politi-
cians’ close relations. This strategy captures the practice of 
employing members of politicians’ wider communities and 
constituencies. We summarize these differences in Table 6.
Choice of Political Strategy
Our data shows that the choice of strategy depends on two 
main factors: (1) urgency, which captures the need for speed; 
and (2) resources, which captures resource availability (e.g. 
funds or budget). For banks, the affective and financial strat-
egies present the lowest cost. The affective strategy does not 
use many employees while the financial strategy does not 
involve additional costs at all. In contrast, pseudo-attribution 
and kinship strategies require huge financial outlays for CSR 
programs and mass recruitments. Accordingly, we found that 
smaller banks (per total assets) tend to mainly use the affec-
tive and financial strategies while the larger banks, due to 
their deeper pockets and stronger reputations, are able to 
deploy the pseudo-attribution and kinship strategies.
Regarding urgency, banks get quicker results when they 
deploy financial and kinship strategies. This is because the 
affective strategy takes time to execute as emotions and trust 
are nurtured over time while the pseudo-attribution strategy 
requires careful planning. In terms of scope, we found that 
banks use more than one strategy at any given time, with 
the larger banks using three of the reported strategies, on 
average. Besides urgency and resource considerations, banks 
 T. A. Liedong et al.
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retain or drop political strategies depending on their effec-
tiveness. They engage in dynamic portfolio management 
whereby positive (negative) outcomes reinforce (weaken) 
reinforce their choice of strategy. In the same way, the out-
comes of CPA tend to reinforce or weaken the rationales for 
doing CPA. For instance, commercial success reinforces the 
commercial rationale. Figure 2 shows a matrix of the deter-
minants of political strategy choice.
Discussion
Our study addresses the lack of research on corporate politi-
cal strategization within the African context in general and 
on financial institutions in particular. Emerging countries are 
risky (Puck et al. 2013; Liedong et al. 2017), which makes it 
necessary for firms to develop political strategies for influ-
encing their volatile environments (Nell et al. 2015). How-
ever, besides informal political ties and connections (Peng 
and Luo 2000; Rajwani and Liedong 2015), there is a pau-
city of research that explores the full breadth of political 
strategies used in emerging countries, especially in Africa. 
Drawing on resource-dependency logics, and using inter-
views with bank executives (for firms’ perspective) and sec-
ondary data (to capture politicians’ dealings with banks), 
we show that the organization of CPA is dependent on the 
type of regulations (procedural versus transformational) that 
firms seek to influence. This finding is a new addition to the 
literature. Previous studies have only captured the role of 
national culture, financial resources and product diversifica-
tion in political strategy formulation (e.g. Barron 2011; Hill-
man and Hitt 1999). They have barely explored how types of 
regulations affect how CPA is organized.
Firms in Nigeria deploy some “dark” strategies to wield 
political influence. These strategies are unconventional, 
unethical and different from what is already captured in 
extant literature, but they are effective for influencing poli-
ticians in the local context. More importantly, these political 
strategies reflect the nature of the dependency relationship 
between firms and politicians. This relationship is based on 
the principle of reciprocal interdependence, in the sense that 
firms and politicians engage in a social exchange with atten-
dant obligations for each party (Li et al. 2015; Jia and Zhang 
2016). Politicians depend on banks to duly or unduly receive 
the financial benefits of public office. They also depend on 
firms’ CSR and employment practices to enhance their polit-
ical images and boost their re-election. In return, the politi-
cians offer the banks audience, protection, and commercial 
opportunities. The challenge of reciprocal interdependence 
is that in weak institutional contexts, it could be fraught with 
unethical practices, as our data shows.
Previous scholarship has noted that politicians and firms 
transact in political markets (Bonardi et al. 2005; Kingsley 
et al. 2012). In these markets, firms have to offer what politi-
cians want (e.g. money, information) in return for political 
favours (Hillman and Hitt 1999). In highly corrupt Nigeria 
(Agbiboa 2012; Smith 2007), politicians need money to 
finance clientelism, vote buying schemes and re-election. 
They also need money to support their opulent lifestyles 
and provide financial security for their families and asso-
ciates. For banks, this creates an opportunity not to only 
contribute actual money, but to render financial facilitation 
services. These services may include preferential access to 
Table 6  Similarity and differences of political strategies across contexts
In advanced economy contexts (e.g. 
U.S, U.K)
In Asian emerging market contexts 
(e.g. China, Brazil, Indonesia)
In African emerging market contexts 
(Nigeria)
Affective strategy No scholarly treatment No scholarly treatment Using attractive female employees to 
gain political favours
Financial strategy PAC contributions, soft money, 
lobbying
Campaign donations Using financial services to help 
politicians benefit duly and unduly 
benefit from financial resources
Pseudo-attribution strategy No extensive scholarly treatment CSR generally used to gain legiti-
macy and political access
CSR targeted at politicians’ com-
munities; CSR actively involves 
politicians
Kinship strategy Similar to recruitment of politicians 
and ex-politicians
Similar to formal and informal con-
nections to politicians, their family 
members and friends
Recruitment of politicians’ relations; 
Recruitment of politicians’ com-
munity members
Affective Pseudo-Attribution
Financial Kinship
Resource Availability
Low High
Low
High
Urgency
Fig. 2  Political strategy matrix
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loans, overridden due diligence in financial transactions, and 
collusion to unduly benefit from public financial resources. 
Generally, financial strategies are ethically suspect (Hillman 
and Hitt 1999) and this is true in weak institutional contexts 
such as Nigeria.
Based on insights from our data, we argue that not all 
political strategies are available to all firms. Rather, politi-
cal strategies may be industry-specific. In other words, dif-
ferent industries may have different ways of appealing to 
politicians. We found that the banking industry has a unique 
opportunity to manage the finances of politicians in return 
for policy favours. This opportunity is not available to firms 
in other industries. Generally, beyond the understanding 
that heavily regulated industries are politically active (Grier 
et al. 1994; Hadani and Schuler 2013), not much is known 
about what unique political tactics are available to differ-
ent industries. Our study thus generates valuable insight for 
CPA, as it suggests that reciprocal interdependence is exist-
ent or stronger in some industries than in others depending 
on the extent to which industries are directly resourceful to 
politicians. In this sense, political strategies that exploit this 
dependency may be more effective.
In emerging and developing countries, CSR makes 
significant contributions to socio-economic development 
(Liedong et al. 2015), mainly as socially responsible firms 
serve political roles (Scherer et al. 2013) and have analo-
gous power of the State (Matten and Crane 2005). Through 
their activities, they provide a complementary governance 
structure (Amaeshi et al. 2006), which helps them to gain 
political access (Liedong et al. 2017; Su and He 2010; Wang 
and Qian 2011). Subsequently, the extant literature portrays 
political legitimacy as the main mechanism through which 
CSR yields political benefits (Lin et al. 2015). Our data 
provides finer-grained insights about how this legitimacy is 
gained through reciprocal dependency.
In Nigeria, politics is a “do or die” zero-sum game. Com-
petition for political office is fierce, elections are high-stake 
events, and incumbent politicians do everything in their 
power to retain their offices. Nigeria has over 90 registered 
political parties. However, three parties—Peoples Demo-
cratic Party Nigeria (PDP), All Progressives Congress 
(APC) and Labour Party (LP)—dominate the political arena. 
Politicians within these parties face fierce competition at two 
stages. First, they must compete in internal primary elec-
tions to represent their parties. Second, they must compete 
in multi-party State and Federal elections. These elections, 
whether intra or multi-party, are perilous and expensive. 
Party nomination forms could cost as much as N45 million 
(about US$ 125,000), but there is never a shortage of con-
testants because of the unfettered benefits associated with 
political power. The attractiveness of political office perhaps 
explains why 73 candidates competed in the 2019 presi-
dential election. This number of presidential contestants, 
arguably the highest in the world, demonstrates the competi-
tiveness of Nigerian politics. By orchestrating targeted CSR 
in ways that allow politicians to take direct credit for bring-
ing social programs and development to their communities, 
firms improve politicians’ re-election chances, which helps 
them gain legitimacy and political access. Previous studies 
about CSR-CPA have not captured this deeper process of 
legitimization because they were mainly conducted in China 
(e.g. Jia and Zhang 2016), a one-party State where political 
rivalry and competition is comparatively lower than multi-
party democratic Nigeria and where politically targeted CSR 
may not be as important.
While the role of CSR in politics, largely described as 
political CSR, has received attention (e.g. Scherer et al. 
2013) and may be somewhat related to what we found in 
this study, we note a significant difference. Political CSR 
concerns social impacts related to the functioning of a State 
(Frynas and Stephens 2015), not direct business activity as 
we see in our data. In this sense, CSR as a political strategy 
is different from the concept of political CSR. The latter 
is arguably altruistic and driven by utilitarianism while the 
former is underpinned by reciprocal interdependence and 
motivated by idiosyncratic gain. Therefore, we use resource-
dependency theory to advance that reciprocity and duality in 
the dependency relationship between firms and politicians 
is a necessary foundation on which CSR can be deployed as 
a political strategy.
Bringing all the findings into perspective, we develop 
a political strategization framework (Fig. 3). This frame-
work shows that the quest for commercial and business 
opportunities, the desire for regulatory leniency and pro-
tection, and the need to have a voice in policy arenas 
motivate banks to orchestrate CPA. Banks organize their 
CPA depending on whether they are addressing proce-
dural or transformational regulations. When they deal 
with procedural regulations, they are transactional, pas-
sive and collective in their political engagements with 
bureaucrats. In contrast, when they buffer transforma-
tional regulations, they actively and individually use a 
relational approach to target politicians (see detail in 
Table 4). More importantly, banks use a unique array 
of political strategies (see detail in Table 5) that exploit 
their reciprocal dependency relationships with politicians. 
These strategies are supported by politicians’ dependency 
on funds and goodwill for personal enrichment and re-
election. They are also supported by the lack of formal 
business–government interfaces for stakeholder involve-
ment in political processes, and further by the existence 
of politico-socio-cultural conditions (particularly weak 
institutions) that allow unethical practices to prevail. For 
instance, the financial strategy exploits not only poor 
bank supervision and monitoring, but it also capitalizes 
on absent CPA regulations, rampant corruption, and a 
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winner-takes-it all politics. Similarly, the kinship and 
pseudo-attribution strategies exploit political patronage 
in relationship-based systems.
Banks choose their political strategies depending on 
their resource endowment and the urgency of the issues 
they face. Some strategies are cheap (e.g. affective), oth-
ers are best suited for quick results (e.g. financial). The 
interplay of urgency and resource endowment eventually 
determines which strategies are used. It is worth noting 
that CPA outcomes also affect strategy choice, mainly 
as positive (negative) performances reinforce (weaken) 
what is believed to be the optimal strategy. Outcomes 
further influence the rationale or motivation for political 
activity by strengthening or undermining CPA drivers. 
Overall, the framework illustrates the process of orches-
trating CPA (i.e. from drivers to outcomes) and shows 
the moderating and supporting factors of this process. 
Importantly, it highlights how weak institutional condi-
tions and politicians’ need for funds and goodwill enable 
firms to exploit reciprocal dependency and deploy ethi-
cally suspect political strategies.
Practical Relevance and Policy Implications
Besides theoretical contributions, this study offers lessons 
and insights to firms, governments, regulators and develop-
ment partners. First, some of the most egregious cases of 
corruption in Africa usually involve businesses conniving 
with public officials and politicians. For instance, our find-
ings offer insights into how some political strategies (e.g. 
financial strategy) may exploit, aid and abet corruption in 
Nigeria, suggesting the complicity of the private sector in 
this menace. However, it is worth noting that most busi-
nesses in Africa are often the victims of corruption, mainly 
as they face unsurmountable pressures to pay bribes (Mishra 
and Maiko 2017). To find a lasting solution to corruption 
in the region, firms need to help strengthen State institu-
tions by playing a more active role to instigate institutional 
change (Liedong 2017). Some firms do not believe they can 
significantly influence Africa’s institutions (Luiz and Stew-
art 2014); hence, they do not seem to be doing much in 
that regard (Liedong 2017). Nevertheless, this belief might 
hold true only if firms act alone. By forming coalitions and 
industry associations, firms can present a collective front 
that will allow them to buffer institutions in unison and with-
out fear of selective witch-hunt and discrimination. Previ-
ous research has acknowledged the effectiveness of industry 
groups and unions in institutional change (e.g. Barley 2010; 
Rajwani et al. 2015). Therefore, banks in Nigeria could unite 
to use their CPA not to exploit institutional weaknesses and 
pursue idiosyncratic benefits, but to address fundamental 
institutional problems that will help alleviate the biggest 
bane of Africa’s under-development—corruption.
Second, this study has revealed some of the dark and 
unethical strategies used for political influence. These 
strategies have negative ethical implications. For instance, 
the affection strategy could lead to the abuse and exploita-
tion of female workers while the financial strategy could 
aid money laundering. We hope that regulators, especially 
Central Banks, can develop industry-wide codes for govern-
ing CPA. There is also a need to strengthen the monitoring 
and supervisory functions of regulatory bodies so they can 
detect and address some of these ethically suspect political 
strategies.
Finally, this study calls on international agencies to sup-
port or pressure African governments (through aid and 
development assistance) to enact laws that will regulate and 
make CPA transparent. Currently across Africa and other 
developing countries elsewhere, structures and mechanisms 
for business–government relations are either non-existent 
or inefficient (Liedong 2017). This leaves the use of infor-
mal ties as the main way for businesses to have a voice in 
CPA Approach
Procedural vs transformaonal 
regulaons
Financial
Pseudo-A	ribuon
Affecve
CPA Strategies
CPA Drivers & 
Dependency Factors
Commercial & Business 
Opportunies
Regulatory Leniency & 
Arbitrary Treatment
Security & Protecon
Voice and Influence
CPA Level & Target
Kinship
Outcomes
Enabling and Supporng Factors
Strategy Choice Factors
Issue Urgency
Resource Availability
Procedural vs transformaonal 
regulaons
Instuonal
Polico-socio-cultural Condions
Lack of Business-government Interface
Policians’ Dependency on:
Funds for personal enrichment
Funds and goodwill for re-elecon
.. ..
..
Fig. 3  Political strategy framework
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public policy (Rajwani and Liedong 2015), but these ties 
are opaque and often fraught in corruption (Lawton et al. 
2013a). We hope that the insights herein will provide a cata-
lyst for development agencies to support African countries to 
institute mandatory and publicized “comment windows” that 
will enable external stakeholders, especially businesses, to 
make inputs into public policies and regulations. Addition-
ally, African governments need to impose limits on cam-
paign financing to curb vote buying and corruption. They 
also need to adopt public lobbying registers that will show 
who is lobbying who and on what issues. This transparency 
could curb the excesses of CPA. Perhaps, if legitimate and 
formal CPA structures existed, banks in Nigeria would not 
resort to ethically suspect and unconventional strategies.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we note that there is a significant difference in 
how CPA is formulated and executed in Western countries, 
emerging Asian countries and emerging African countries. 
While African and Asian firms may share same motives due 
to having similar institutional conditions, the orchestration of 
CPA is starkly nuanced for African firms. In this nuance lies 
some ethical issues bordering on unfair recruitment practices 
and corruption. Hence, the main thesis of this paper is that 
within the weak institutional environment of Africa, firms 
use context-fitting but ethically suspect strategies that are 
built on the principle of reciprocal interdependence. The 
scanty research on CPA in Africa (e.g. Liedong et al. 2017; 
Liedong and Frynas 2017; Wocke and Moodley 2015; Mba-
lyohere et al. 2017) does not only understate the prevalence 
of firm-politician embeddedness in the region, but it also 
mutes the ethical issues of CPA. Recently, research revealed 
the negative effects of political connections on corporate 
governance in Ghana (Liedong and Rajwani 2018). More of 
such research is needed to identify the negative externalities 
of business–government relationships in Africa.
Limitations and Future Research
Despite our study making important theoretical and practi-
cal contributions, it has some limitations. As seen in many 
qualitative studies, a small sample size limits generaliz-
ability. More importantly, this study focuses on a single 
industry, which limits the extent to which the findings can 
be extrapolated. Further, we could not gain direct access 
to politicians, and hence used secondary data to fill this 
void. Nevertheless, our study has generated rich insights 
about CPA. As we found the financial strategy to be unique 
to the banking industry, it is plausible to think that sub-
industries within financial services (e.g. insurance, mutual 
funds, brokerage, etc.) or even other industries may also 
have their own arsenal of unique strategies for political 
access and influence. Therefore, we hope research can 
build on our study to explore other industry-specific politi-
cal strategies.
We also note that earlier concerns about the negative 
outcomes of CPA have evolved into the development of 
ethical frameworks for evaluating the rationales, mecha-
nisms and outcomes of lobbying and political activity (e.g. 
Keffer and Hill 1997; Oberman 2004; Weber 1997). These 
frameworks are normative and prescriptive, and have 
rarely been put to empirical tests. Moreover, the evalua-
tion of ethicality is subjective, just as morality is. Hence, 
the way CPA is judged to be (un)ethical in one context 
may differ from the way it is judged in other contexts. In 
this respect, it is important for research to investigate how 
managers assess the ethicality of their political activity. 
Contextualizing this point, we found some of the political 
strategies in the Nigerian banking industry to be ethically 
suspect, but that is our distant judgement. Do the manag-
ers of these banks agree with our ethical stance about their 
CPA? If no, how do they determine ethicality? Address-
ing these questions will enrich both the ethics and CPA 
literatures.
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